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I. INTRODUCTION 
In November 2008, Ernesto Galarza, a U.S. citizen of Puerto 
Rican heritage, was arrested by the Allentown Police Department in 
a series of drug arrests aimed at the construction contractor for 
whom he worked.1  Galarza was ultimately acquitted by a jury of 
any drug-related conspiracy charges, but was initially taken into 
custody and detained along with the other arrestees.2  At the time of 
his arrest, he had his Social Security Card and a Pennsylvania 
driver’s license in his wallet, and told local officials that he was born 
in Perth Amboy, NJ.3  Nonetheless, an Allentown police investigator 
called Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)—pursuant 
to Allentown’s policy of contacting ICE whenever someone is 
“suspected” of being an “alien subject to deportation”—and 
reported that Galarza might be an undocumented immigrant.4  
Based on this tip, ICE issued an immigration detainer, asking prison 
officials to hold Galarza while ICE investigated his immigration 
status.5 
 
 1  Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 636 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 2  Id. at 637-38. 
 3  Id. at 637. 
 4  Id. 
 5  Id.  Immigration detainers are used as an enforcement mechanism in what was 
formerly known as the Secure Communities Program (SCP).  Secure Communities, U.S. 
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/secure-communities#a3 (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2015).  The SCP functioned as an information-sharing program 
between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and ICE. ICE Detainers: Frequently 
Asked Questions, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/news/ 
library/factsheets/detainer-faqs.htm) (last visited Aug. 11, 2015).  Traditionally, when 
someone is arrested in a state or local jail, the jail takes the arrestee’s fingerprints, and 
the fingerprints are then sent to an FBI database.  Id.  Under the SCP, the fingerprints 
are then forwarded to ICE.  Id.  ICE uses the fingerprints to investigate the individual’s 
immigration status.  Id.  If – upon completion of its investigation – ICE suspects that 
the individual is violating civil immigration law, it can issue a detainer to the state or 
local jail; requesting that the individual be detained until ICE agents arrive to assume 
custody of the arrestee.  Id.  The individual can remain in detention at the state or local 
jail even after he/she is scheduled for release by the jail.  Id.  ICE – once it has custody 
of the individual – can initiate deportation proceedings.  Id.  In November 2014, the 
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Despite posting his $15,000 bail the day after his arrest, Galarza 
was not released from Lehigh County Prison due to the ICE 
detainer.6  He remained in jail for the next three days, without a 
warrant or an explanation for his continued detention.7  He was 
eventually released after ICE agents arrived to interrogate him and 
confirmed his U.S. citizenship.8  Galarza filed a lawsuit against the 
Allentown Police Department of Lehigh County and ICE seeking 
damages for losing his part-time job and lost wages.9  In April 2012, 
the District Court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss.10  In May 2014, the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled in Galarza’s favor, holding that compliance with ICE 
detainers is not mandatory and that Lehigh County was free to 
release Galarza after he posted bail.11  The case was eventually settled 
and Galarza was awarded $145,000 in damages and attorney’s 
fees.12  Soon thereafter, “the Lehigh County Board of Commissions 
voted unanimously to end the County’s policy of imprisoning 
people on ICE detainers.”13 
 
 
Obama Administration altered the SCP; the changes were announced in a 
memorandum issued by ICE Secretary, Jeh Charles Johnson.  Memorandum from Jeh 
Charles Johnson, Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., on Secure Communities, (Nov. 
20, 2014) (on file with U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_commu
nities.pdf.  The memorandum announced that the SCP would be renamed the 
Priorities Enforcement Program (PEP), and that the program’s focus would shift from 
a broad-based detention of all suspected immigration violators – including non-violent 
offenders – to a more limited detention, focusing only on those individuals with 
serious criminal records.  Id.  The memorandum cited several factors that made such 
changes necessary, including a deficient of trust between immigrant communities and 
Law Enforcement, pushback from state and local governments refusing to honor 
detainer requests or limiting compliance therewith, increasing litigation revolving 
around ICE detainers, and decisions by federal courts rejecting the authority of state 
and local governments to issue detainers.  Id.  Accordingly, the secretary directed ICE 
to only issue detainers for those aliens who have been convicted of a serious offense or 
who otherwise pose a danger to national security.  Id. 
 6  Galarza, 745 F.3d at 637. 
 7  Id.  
 8  Id.  
 9  Id. at 638.  
 10  Id. (“[T]he District Court dismissed the Fourth Amendment and procedural due 
process claims against Lehigh County on the ground that neither of the policies 
identified in the plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is unconstitutional because both are 
consistent with federal statutes and regulation.” (internal quotation marks omitted and 
formatting altered)).  
 11  See id. at 645.  
 12  ACLU, Galarza v. Szalczyk, (June 18, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/immigrants-
rights/galarza-v-szalczyk. 
 13  Id.  
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Because of the Secure Communities Program (“SCP” or “the 
program”), the Obama Administration has deported over 2.3 
million people.14  Before the Obama Administration overhauled the 
SCP, many states and municipalities, as a result of increased 
litigation, began to alter the scope of compliance with ICE 
detainers.15  Several municipalities began refusing to honor ICE 
detainers altogether.16  Additionally, some states began passing 
legislation limiting the scope of state compliance with ICE 
detainers.17  Recently, the Obama Administration overhauled the 
SCP, renaming it the “Priorities Enforcement Program” (PEP) and 
shifting the program’s focus to target individuals with serious 
criminal records.18 
In light of certain legal and public policy considerations, state 
and local governments should either refuse to honor ICE detainer 
requests altogether or follow in the footsteps of Connecticut and 
California and pass laws similar to the Transparency and 
Responsibility Using State Tools (“TRUST”) Act, which limits the 
scope of compliance with ICE detainers.  Although the Obama 
Administration reformed the SCP, the new program continues to 
rely on ICE detainers as the primary enforcement mechanism, and 
therefore will continue to raise serious legal issues for state and local 
governments.19  Also, there is no guarantee that the new changes will 
remain.20 
 
 14  Julia Preston, Republicans Resist Obama’s Move to Dismantle Apparatus of 
Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/16/ 
us/secure-communities-immigration-program-battle.html?hp&action= click&pgtype= 
Homepage&module=photo-spot-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news 
(noting that the secure communities program has led to the deportation of 2.3 million 
people under the Obama Administration); see CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK, 
State and Localities That Limit Compliance with ICE Detainer Requests, (Nov. 2014), 
https://cliniclegal.org/resources/articles-clinic/states-and-localities-limit-compliance-
ice-detainer-requests-jan-2014 (estimating that the Obama Administration deported 
nearly 1.5 million during the first term).  
 15  Amanda Peterson Beadle, Why 250 Counties Have Stopped Honoring Local ICE 
Detainers, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL: IMMIGRATION IMPACT (Sept. 22, 
2015), http://immigrationimpact.com/2014/09/22/why-250-counties-have-stopped-
honoring-local-ice-detainers/. 
 16  See id. 
 17  AP Report: California Immigrant Deportations Plummet After TRUST Act, CBS SAN 
FRANCISCO (April 6, 2014), http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2014/04/06/ 
immigration-deportation-trust-act/. 
 18  See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 19  Aura Bogado, Goodbye, Secure Communities, Hello, Priority Enforcement Program, 
COLORLINES (Nov. 21, 2014), http://colorlines.com/archives/2014/11/goodbye_ 
secure_communities_hello_priority_enforcement_program.html. 
 20  See infra Part II (A)(3)(iii). 
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The TRUST Act limits state and local law enforcement’s ability 
to prolong detention based on ICE detainer requests.21  Legal and 
public policy reasons weigh heavily in favor of states adopting 
similar policies, and might go as far as to warrant that local Law 
Enforcement Agencies (“LEA”) across the country voluntarily refuse 
to honor ICE detainer requests, as many have already done.  Several 
public policy reasons militate against willful and unrestrained 
enforcement of detainer requests.  First, recent cases have made it 
clear that detainer requests are not warrants, and so prolonged 
detention of a documented person, in violation of her Fourth 
Amendment rights, can result in significant liability for local LEAs.  
Second, statutes and case law make it clear that local LEAs are not 
required to comply with detainer requests.  Third, the cost of 
enforcing detainer requests can burden local LEAs, especially 
because the federal government does not compensate them for 
prolonging the detention of prisoners in local jails on suspected 
violations of federal immigration law.  Fourth, recent studies show 
that the SCP, in which immigration detainers play a significant role, 
does not lower crime rates, and in fact, may even negatively impact 
law enforcement. 
Part II will examine the historical development of detainer 
requests and its current state in the context of the SCP, a general 
trend that developed among LEAs refusing to honor detainer 
requests, and the passage of the TRUST Act.  Part III will consider 
the legal and public policy issues implicated by detainer requests as 
well as the legal issues implicated by state laws seeking to regulate 
detainer requests.  Part IV will conclude that in light of the legal 
problems that arise from detainers, the liability that municipalities 
may incur, the cost of enforcing detainers, the failure of detainers to 
lower crime rates, and the lack of legal obstacles in the way of 
legislation that significantly curtails the scope of detainer requests, 
every state should either adopt a version of California’s TRUST Act 
or local municipalities should consider refusing to honor detainer 
requests altogether. 
 
 21  RECENT LEGISLATION: Immigration Law - Criminal Justice and Immigration 
Enforcement - California Limits Local Entities’ Compliance with Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement Detainer Requests. - TRUST Act, 2013 Cal. Stat. 4650 (Codified at Cal. Gov’t 
Code §§7282-7282.5 (West Supp. 2014)), 127 HARV. L. REV. 2593, 2593 (2014), available 
at http://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/vol127_trust_act_ 
2013.pdf. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
This section will discuss the historical development of detainer 
requests as a deportation mechanism and its modern development 
within the context of the Secure Communities Program.  It will also 
discuss a broad trend that developed among local LEAs refusing to 
honor detainer requests, the eventual passage of the TRUST Act, and 
recent actions taken by the Obama Administration in overhauling 
the Secure Communities Program. 
A. The Historical Development of ICE Detainer Requests 
i. What Is an Immigration Detainer and How Does It 
Work? 
 Immigration detainers are used by “ICE and other Department 
of Homeland Security (“DHS”) officials to identify potentially 
deportable individuals who are housed in local jails or 
prisons[.] . . .”22  Detainers are requests, not commands; they are not 
warrants and do not provide probable cause.  Additionally, they are 
not indicative of a person’s immigration status, nor are they capable 
of initiating deportation proceedings.23  Unlike a Notice to Appear 
(“NTA”), which is an official civil-immigration filing that 
commences a removal proceeding against an individual, an 
immigration detainer merely states that “an investigation has been 
initiated to determine whether this person is subject to removal 
from the United States.”24  Any authorized immigration official or 
local police officer designated to act as an immigration official can 
issue a detainer to any other federal, state, or local LEA.25  
Functionally, 
[a] detainer notifies the LEA that ICE intends to assume custody of an 
arrestee, requests information about the arrestee’s pending release, and 
requests that the LEA ‘maintain custody of an alien who would otherwise 
be released for a period not to exceed 48 hours (excluding Saturdays, 
Sundays, and holidays) to provide ICE time to assume custody.’26 
  
 
 22  IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER, Immigration Detainers A Comprehensive Look, (Feb. 
17, 2010), http://immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/immigration-detainers-
comprehensive-look. 
 23  Id.  
 24  Id.  
 25  Id. See 8 C.F.R §§ 287.7(a), (b); see also 8 C.F.R § 287(g).  
 26  RECENT LEGISLATION, supra note 21, at 2593-94 (citing ICE Detainers: Frequently 
Asked Questions, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/news/ 
library/factsheets/detainer-faqs.htm) (last visited Sept. 19, 2014)).  
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ii. The History and Development of Immigration 
Detainers 
Historically, “[d]etainers have long been used by federal 
immigration officials.”27  Before 1987, immigration detainers only 
served to notify jail or prison officials that federal immigration 
officials were interested in a particular prisoner, and to request that 
federal immigration officials be notified before the release of the 
prisoner in question.28  In 1987, however, the Executive branch 
promulgated federal regulations requiring agencies receiving an 
immigration detainer to maintain custody of the prisoner of interest 
for up to 48 hours after his or her release date, to allow time for 
immigration officials to arrive and take custody.29  The importance 
of detainers increased dramatically after the federal government 
launched the Secure Communities Program.30  The SCP was 
implemented with the goal of deporting immigrants who 
committed serious crimes.  Particularly, the program was interested 
in “prisoners who were awaiting trial or serving sentences for local, 
state, or federal crimes.”31 
Before the SCP, the process of identifying and interviewing 
those suspected of immigration violations was labor intensive, time-
consuming, costly, and inefficient.32  The SCP, however, fused 
traditional arrest procedures with technological innovation to create 
“a system of universal and automated screening such that every single 
person arrested by a local enforcement official anywhere in the 
country would be screened by the federal government for 
immigration status and deportability eligibility.”33  Normally, when 
someone is arrested and booked by a LEA, “fingerprints are taken 
and forwarded electronically to the FBI, which conducts a criminal 
background check and sends the results to the local enforcement 
agency.”34  Under the SCP, the fingerprints received by the FBI are 
 
 27  Christopher N. Lasch, Preempting Immigration Detainer Enforcement Under 
Arizona v. United States, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 281, 286 (2013). 
 28  Id. at 287. 
 29  Id.  
 30  Id.  
 31  Id.  
 32  Thomas J. Miles & Adam B. Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? 
Evidence from Secure Communities, 57 J.L. & ECON. 937, 946-47 (2014) (“Federal 
personnel conducted these screenings in less than 15 percent of local jails and prisons, 
and local officials were authorized to do the screenings themselves in only about two 
percent of the nation’s counties.”).  
 33  Id. at 947.  
 34  Id.  
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automatically and electronically forwarded to the DHS.35  “DHS [] 
then compares the fingerprints against its Automated Biometric 
Identification System, a database which stores biometric and 
biographical information on persons encountered by the agency in 
the course of its immigration-related or other activities.”36 
The database contains fingerprints of three different categories 
of foreign-born persons: [(1)] noncitizens [currently] in the United 
States in violation of immigration law, such as persons who were 
previously deported or overstayed their visas; [(2)] noncitizens who 
are lawfully in the United States [but have been arrested and] might 
become deportable [if they are] convicted of the crime for which 
they have been arrested; and [(3)] citizens who naturalized at some 
date after their fingerprints were included in the database.37 
If the fingerprints received by the DHS match a set in its 
database, DHS personnel evaluate the person’s immigration status 
and determine whether to place a detainer on the person.38  The 
detainer requests that the local LEA hold the person for 48 hours 
beyond the scheduled release to facilitate the person’s transfer by 
ICE into federal custody and to initiate deportation proceedings 
thereafter.39  Thus, the detainer allows the federal government to 
readily apprehend and place in deportation proceedings a 
noncitizen who would otherwise be released by the local LEA.40 
Fully implementing the program took nearly four years.41  
Beginning on October 27, 2008, “the federal government rolled out 
the program on a county-by-county basis.”42  In the spring of 2012, 
the SCP was functioning in all but a handful of counties.43  By 
January 2013, it was completely implemented nationwide.44  The 
program has led to more than 300,000 deportations since 2008.45 
 
 35  Id.  
 36  Id. 
 37  Id.  
 38  Thomas J. Miles & Adam B. Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? 
Evidence from Secure Communities, 57 J.L. & ECON. 937, 947 (2014). 
 39  Id.  
 40  Id.  
 41  Id. at 948.  
 42  Id. 
 43  Id.  
 44  Thomas J. Miles & Adam B. Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? 
Evidence from Secure Communities, 57 J.L. & ECON. 937, 947 (2014). 
 45  AP Report: California Immigrant Deportations Plummet After TRUST, supra note 17. 
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B. State and Local Governments Respond to Detainer Requests 
Currently, a movement is underway whereby state 
governments, local governments, and federal courts are challenging 
the enforcement of ICE detainers.  At first, it was unclear whether 
compliance with Secure Communities was mandatory.46  The DHS 
has since made it clear that compliance with detainers is not 
mandatory because they are merely “requests” and not 
“commands.”47  Initially, the only way a local LEA could prevent 
DHS’s immigration checks from taking place would be to stop 
fingerprinting arrestees altogether.48  However, when it became clear 
that ICE detainers were not mandatory, many jurisdictions simply 
refused to honor them.49 
i. Local Counties Refusing to Honor ICE Detainers 
In 2013, the city of Newark, New Jersey, issued a policy refusing 
to honor ICE detainers that was among the most expansive in the 
nation “because it has no exception for particularly serious 
offenses.”50  Other state and local governments continued this trend 
in 2014 “following a decision by a federal court in Oregon 
concluding that some detainers violate arrestees’ Fourth 
Amendment Rights.”51  To date, three states, the District of 
Columbia, at least twenty-five cities, and over two-hundred counties 
“have officially restricted the extent to which law enforcement may 
 
 46  Miles & Cox, supra note 32, at 949 n.10; see 8 C.F.R. § 287(d) (“Upon a 
determination by the Department to issue a detainer for an alien not otherwise 
detained by a criminal justice agency, such agency shall maintain custody of the alien for 
a period not to exceed 48 hours, (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays) in order 
to permit assumption of custody by the Department.”) (emphasis added).  
 47  Letter from Ari Rosmarin, Pub. Policy Dir. and Alexander Shalom, Senior Staff 
Attorney, ACLU, to County Officials (July 15, 2014), https://www.aclu-nj.org/ 
files/2514/0552/4157/2014_07_16_ICE.pdf (“In a brief filed in a 2013 case 
challenging ICE detainers, government attorneys representing the Department of 
Homeland Security acknowledged that ‘ICE detainers issued pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 
287.7 are voluntary requests’ . . . ICE detainers . . . do not impose a requirement upon 
state or local law enforcement agencies.  On February 25, 2014, David Ragsdale, then-
Acting Director of ICE . . . confirmed that ICE detainers ‘are not mandatory as a matter 
of law.’”). 
 48  Miles & Cox, supra note 32, at 948.  
 49  See id. at 963.  
 50  Rutgers School of Law, A Brick City Victory: Newark Police Refuse to Honor ICE 
Detainers, CLINIC NEWS, Fall 2014, at 6, https://law.newark.rutgers.edu/files/Clinic 
NewsFall2014.pdf. 
 51  See id.; Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cnty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 
1414305 (D.Or. Apr. 11, 2014).  
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continue to detain individuals to hand over to ICE.”52 
Recently, in Colorado, a state where ICE issued more than 
8,700 detainers in two years, all of the state’s 64 Sheriffs announced 
that they will no longer honor ICE detainers.53  In September 2014, 
the Long Island Sherriff’s Department announced that it would no 
longer honor ICE detainers “unless federal officials produce 
warrants from a judge,” citing concerns over civil rights lawsuits.54  
Lastly, on October 22, 2014, the New York City Council passed 
legislation that limits the city’s compliance with detainer requests to 
only those detainers that are accompanied by a warrant from a judge 
and “the subject of the warrant was convicted within the last five 
years of a violent or serious crime, or is a possible match on the 
terrorism watch list.”55  In total, nearly 270 jurisdictions are refusing 
to issue ICE detainers.56 
ii. The TRUST Act: States’ Attempt to Limit the Scope of 
Compliance with ICE Detainers 
In 2013, Connecticut—soon followed by California—passed 
legislation that significantly curtailed the scope of detainer requests.  
On October 5, 2013, California Governor Jerry Brown signed the 
TRUST Act into law to “limit[] local discretion to enforce 
detainers.”57  Essentially, local LEAs can only enforce a detainer if 
the prisoner in question has ever been convicted of one of a defined 
range of crimes.58  To be sure, the range of crimes is extensive in the 
California bill, “encompassing obstruction of justice, unlawful 
possession or use of a weapon, or any state felony, among other 
crimes.”59  The Connecticut law, by contrast, only honors ICE 
detainers if the person has been convicted of a serious or violent 
felony.60  Governor Brown signed the TRUST Act after he vetoed an 
 
 52  Rutgers School of Law, supra note 50; Preston, supra note 14. 
 53  Keith Coffman, All County Sheriffs in Colorado Halt Federal Immigration Holds: 
ACLU, REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2014, 6:43 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/ 
09/18/us-usa-colorado-immigration-idUSKBN0HD2PI20140918. 
 54  Kristin Thorne, Long Island Sheriffs Won’t Continue Immigration Detentions, EYE 
WITNESS NEWS ABC 7 (Sept. 18, 2014), http://7online.com/politics/long-island-sheriffs-
saying-no-to-immigrant-detentions/314121/.  
 55  Jillian Jorgensen, Council Passes Bill to Stop Cooperation With Federal Immigration 
Detainers, NEW YORK OBSERVER (Oct. 22, 2014, 3:45 PM), http://observer.com/2014/10/ 
council-passes-bills-to-stop-cooperation-with-federal-immigration-detainers/. 
 56  Preston, supra note 14. 
 57  RECENT LEGISLATION, supra note 21, at 2593, 2595. 
 58  See id. 
 59  See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 60  Amanda Peterson Beadle, States Work To Improve Immigration Policies As Senate 
OMAR FINAL FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2016  8:59 PM 
2015] BREAKING THE ICE 169 
earlier version of the bill, calling it “fatally flawed” because it barred 
the state from detaining individuals on behalf of ICE “even when 
the individual is charged with or convicted of significant crimes, 
including offenses such as child abuse, drug trafficking and gang 
activity.”61  The current version of the TRUST Act alters its 
predecessor by “making the list of crimes classified as serious 
offenses more extensive.”62  The number of deportations has 
declined dramatically since the passage of the TRUST Act.63  
Preliminary data on California’s TRUST Act suggests at least a 44% 
drop in deportations, from 2,984 to 1,660, since its passage.64 
iii. President Obama’s Executive Action Reforming the 
Use of Immigration Detainers 
Faced with the many state and local governments taking action 
to limit the scope of ICE detainers under the Secure Communities 
Program, President Obama recently issued an Executive Action 
significantly overhauling the program.65  The new measure, known 
as the “Priority Enforcement Program” (PEP), “will continue to rely 
on finger-print based biometric data submitted during bookings by 
state and local law enforcement agencies to the [FBI] for criminal 
background checks.”66  Now, however, ICE will only seek the 
transfer of custody if the arrestee has been convicted of a serious 
crime or is a perceived threat to national security.67  This brings 
federal law more in line with the rules and policies espoused by the 
TRUST Act. 
It is not clear how permanent these new reforms will be.  
President Obama’s actions are being challenged in Congress and in 
the courts.  Since President Obama announced his Executive Action, 
twenty-four states led by Texas have signed onto a lawsuit 
 
Immigration Bill Debate Begins, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL: IMMIGRATION IMPACT 
(June 7, 2013), http://immigrationimpact.com/2013/06/07/states-work-to-improve-
immigration-policies-as-senate-immigration-bill-debate-
begins/#sthash.1SLgy5Ps.dpuf. 
 61  Elise Foley & Roque Planas, Trust Act Signed In California To Limit Deportation 
Program, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 5, 2013, 4:414), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2013/10/05/trust-act-signed_n_4050168.html. 
 62  Id. 
 63  Coffman, supra note 53. 
 64  See AP Report: California Immigrant Deportations Plummet After TRUST Act, supra 
note 17.  
 65  Preston, supra note 14. 
 66  Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, supra note 5, at 2-3.  
 67  Id. at 2.  
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challenging it.68  Additionally, President Obama is facing pushback 
from a Republican-controlled Congress.69  Recently, the House of 
Representatives passed a bill that would restore the SCP.70  For now, 
President Obama has vowed to veto the measure.71  But the 2016 
presidential election may yield a president who agrees with the 
House on this issue, and so it is possible that the SCP will be 
restored.  Therefore, because of the challenges to reforming 
immigration detainers from Congress and in the courts, and due to 
a potential shift in the White House, state and local governments 
should continue passing affirmative policies that regulate 
interactions between federal immigration officials and prisoners 
housed in state and local jails. 
III. LEGAL AND PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES IMPLICATED BY DETAINER REQUESTS 
REQUIRE THAT STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS REFORM THEIR 
RESPONSES 
The use of immigration detainers raises several legal questions, 
especially where LEAs detain persons with legal immigration status.  
The Fourth Amendment is implicated because detainers are not 
warrants, meaning that continued detention based on their issuance 
raises concerns regarding improper seizure.72  Immigration 
detainers also raise potential Equal Protection problems because the 
initial determination to detain someone suspected of violating 
immigration laws is often made based on race, ethnicity, or national 
origin.73  Moreover, the Tenth Amendment is also implicated 
because, should the federal government move to compel LEAs to 
detain certain individuals, it would impermissibly coerce and 
conscript state and local government functions.74 
Several public policy issues present additional concerns for 
immigration detainers.  First, detainer requests burden 
municipalities with extended jail time expenses and with the legal 
 
 68  Ashley Killough, 24 States Now Suing Obama Over Immigration, CNN (Dec. 10, 
2014, 11:41 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/10/politics/immigration-lawsuit/. 
 69  Preston, supra note 14. 
 70  Id. (“[T]he House passed a Homeland Security funding bill that would cancel 
his programs protecting illegal immigrants.  The measure would restore Secure 
Communities and increase its funding, while taking away the president’s authority to 
set priorities for deportation.  Mr. Obama said . . . that he would veto the measure, 
which now goes to the Senate.”).  
 71  Id.  
 72  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 73  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 74  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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fees needed to defend their actions in response to those requests.  
Second, with respect to law enforcement, detainers have had little 
to no effect on crime reduction.75  In fact, detainers may exacerbate 
crime rates by obstructing community policing.76 
A. Legal Problems and Municipal Liability 
As discussed, immigration detainers can result in litigation on 
issues related to the Fourth Amendment, the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the Tenth Amendment, respectively. 
i. The Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures by requiring the issuance of a warrant with probable 
cause before a place is searched or a person or thing is seized.77  
Hence, under the Fourth Amendment, arrests must be either based 
on a warrant or supported by probable cause to believe that the 
person has committed the violation in question.78  Furthermore, 
“[t]he Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, 
including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of 
traditional arrest.”79  For this reason, detainers provoke serious 
Fourth Amendment concerns because there is “no requirement of 
probable cause prior to prolonged detention pursuant to a 
detainer.”80  As a result, “[t]he absence of a probable cause 
requirement routinely appears to [produce] warrantless 
investigatory arrests pursuant to immigration detainers.”81 
Another problem is the lack of procedural safeguards in the 
 
 75  See generally Miles & Cox, supra note 32. 
 76  RECENT LEGISLATION, supra note 21, at 2599. 
 77  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 78  Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34-35 (1963) (“The lawfulness of the arrest 
without warrant, in turn, must be based upon probable cause, which exists where the 
facts and circumstances within their (the officers’) knowledge and of which they had 
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” 
(citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted).  But see Keil v. Triveline, 661 F.3d 981, 
985 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Officers may also be entitled to qualified immunity if they arrest 
a suspect under the mistaken belief that they have probable cause to do so, provided 
that the mistake is objectively reasonable.”).   
 79  United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (internal citations 
omitted).  
 80  Christopher N. Lasch, Federal Immigration Detainers After Arizona v. United 
States, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 629, 695 (2013); Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 216 
(1st Cir. 2015) (holding the Constitution requires probable cause for the issuance of 
immigration detainers).   
 81  Lasch, supra note 80,at 696. 
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issuance of detainers.  Typically, ICE lodges a detainer against a 
suspected immigration violator by faxing the Form I-247 detainer to 
the prison or jail.82  Under most circumstances, a detainer is then 
issued based solely on the fact that an investigation has been 
“initiated.”83  The initiation of an investigation, however, does not 
sufficiently establish probable cause, because the Fourth 
Amendment does not permit seizures for mere investigations.84  In 
Arizona v. United States,85 Justice Alito highlighted this issue with a 
hypothetical.86  Justice Alito imagined that a police officer, during a 
traffic-stop for a non-immigration violation such as speeding, 
“acquires reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver entered the 
country illegally.”87  Absent reasonable suspicion, Justice Alito said, 
the traffic stop could “become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond 
the time reasonably required to complete the mission.”88  Justice 
Alto explained that the officer’s reasonable suspicion “that [the 
driver] committed a different crime” would justify extending the 
detention “for a reasonable time to verify or dispel that suspicion.”89 
Accordingly, Justice Alito warned that the “length and nature” 
of the additional investigation must be reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, because if prolonged, it can become an arrest requiring 
probable cause.90  Justice Alito noted that “the line between 
detention and arrest is crossed ‘when the police, without probable 
cause or a warrant, forcibly remove a person from his home or other 
place in which he is entitled to be and transport him to the police 
station, where he is detained, although briefly, for investigative 
purposes.”91  Analogizing this holding to the use of ICE detainers, 
detaining an individual after she has been cleared for release from 
jail is akin to “forcibly removing” her from a place where she is 
entitled to be, and would therefore be deemed an arrest requiring 
probable cause or a warrant. 
Additionally, there is no requirement that a person held 
 
 82  Id.  
 83  Id. at 697. 
 84  Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2509 (2012) (“Detaining individuals 
solely to verify their immigration status would raise constitutional concerns.”).  
 85  Id. at 2492. 
 86  Id. at 2528 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 87  Id.  
 88  Id. at 2528. 
 89  Id.  
 90  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2529.  
 91  Id.  (quoting Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
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pursuant to a detainer be taken before a neutral and detached 
magistrate within 48 hours absent extraordinary circumstances.92  
This practice is especially problematic because it “runs directly 
counter to the Court’s declaration that the Fourth Amendment 
requires any person subjected to a warrantless arrest be brought 
before a neutral magistrate for a probable cause determination 
within forty-eight hours—including weekends and holidays—
absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances.”93 
In Miranda-Olivares,94 the plaintiff, Maria Miranda-Olivares, 
was arrested for violations of state family law, but was not released 
after posting bail due to an ICE detainer.95  The defendant, 
Clackamas County, Oregon, argued that the plaintiff’s Fourth 
Amendment rights were not violated because the Fourth 
Amendment analysis only applies to allegations that an individual 
was deprived of liberty prior to the government’s determination of 
legal custody.96  The court, however, disagreed with the defendant’s 
argument, and asserted that the “continuation of her detention 
based on the ICE detainer embarked Miranda-Olivares on a 
subsequent and new ‘prolonged warrantless, post-arrest, pre-
arraignment custody.’”97  The court endorsed the proposition that 
an arrestee’s liberty could not be restricted after “a court has either 
ordered [her] release or concluded that the lawful authority to hold 
[her] on a case no longer exists . . . . “98  After such a determination, 
the court “may no longer treat the individual as a pretrial 
detainee . . . . “99  Hence, “any continued detention beyond the 
period necessary to execute the [court] order [is] analyzed as a new 
arrest under the Fourth Amendment.”100  The court held that, “upon 
resolution of her state charges, the County no longer had probable 
cause to justify her detention.”101 
ii. The Fourteenth Amendment and Equal Protection 
Detainer enforcement presents a dilemma for officials because, 
oftentimes, identifying potential deportable individuals requires 
 
 92  Lasch, supra note 80, at 695-96.  
 93  Id.  
 94  Miranda-Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at *1. 
 95  Id. at *1-2. 
 96  Id. at *9. 
 97  Id.  
 98  Id. (internal citation omitted).   
 99  Id.  
 100  Miranda-Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305 at *10. 
 101  Id. 
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that government officials make characterizations based on race, 
ethnicity, or national origin.  The Equal Protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits these kinds of discrimination, 
unless such characterization overcomes strict scrutiny.102  In Morales 
v. Chadbourne,103 the plaintiff alleged “that ICE officials 
impermissibly based their decision to issue a detainer solely on her 
place of birth and/or her Spanish surname.”104  Ms. Morales’s 
encounter with immigration authorities began when she was 
arrested on state criminal charges for allegedly misrepresenting 
information on a state public benefits application.105  At the state 
police station, a state official asked Ms. Morales whether she was 
“legal.”106  Ms. Morales replied that she was born in Guatemala and 
naturalized in the United States.107  Following her initial interview, 
a state official reported Ms. Morales’ information to ICE.108  Searches 
of ICE’s database did not reveal any immigration violations by Ms. 
Morales.109  Nevertheless, ICE issued a “Notice of Action” to the state 
authorities, informing them that Ms. Morales’ immigration status 
was under investigation.110  After a state court hearing to resolve her 
criminal charge, the judge withdrew the warrant against Ms. Morales 
and released her on $10,000 personal recognizance.111  But, since 
the immigration detainer was issued against Ms. Morales, she 
remained in state custody for an additional night.112  ICE assumed 
custody of Ms. Morales the following day and she was released only 
when ICE confirmed her citizenship after subjecting her to several 
hours of interviews.113 
Ms. Morales later filed suit to remedy her prolonged detention.  
She alleged that ICE “assumed without sufficient legal cause” that 
she was not a U.S. citizen and incorrectly listed her nationality as 
 
 102  McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (noting that, given the 
historical development of the Fourteenth Amendment, racial classifications are subject 
to the “most rigid scrutiny”); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) 
(“Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature 
odious . . . .”). 
 103  Morales v. Chadbourne, 996 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D.R.I. 2014). 
 104  Id. at 24. 
 105  Id. at 24. 
 106  Id. 
 107  Id. 
 108  Id. 
 109  Morales , 996 F. Supp. 2d at 24. 
 110  Id. at 25. 
 111  Id. 
 112  Id. 
 113  Id. 
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Guatemalan in the detainer form.114  She further alleged that ICE 
officials “made this assumption based on her race, ethnicity, and/or 
national origin.”115  Additionally, she argued that ICE would not 
have assumed that she was an “alien” without conducting further 
research had it not been for her race, ethnicity, or national origin.116 
The court agreed with Ms. Morales, asserting that “ICE 
investigated Ms. Morales simply because she was born in another 
country.”117  The court explained that “[u]sing Ms. Morales’ nation 
of birth as a sole permissible basis for her loss of liberty does not 
pass constitutional muster.”118  The court found this to be 
“particularly true in light of the large number of current United 
States citizens that were born in another country” because “[t]o hold 
otherwise would mean that the approximately 17 million foreign-
born United States citizens could automatically be subject to 
detention and deprivation of their liberty rights.”119  The court 
observed that “[s]uch a large number of immediate suspects, based 
solely on their national origin, cannot be justified under the equal 
protection clause.”120  Additionally, the court noted that the ICE 
official “had information in his possession, or readily available to 
him, that would have permitted him to verify Ms. Morales’s status 
as a United States citizen before issuing the detainer,” but the official 
still “categorized Ms. Morales because she was foreign born and 
treated her differently than others based on this impermissible 
characteristic.”121 
iii. The Tenth Amendment 
The sphere of federalism carved out by the Tenth Amendment 
does not permit the federal government to coerce or conscript state 
and local government entities.122  To date, “[t]here has been 
considerable debate and confusion over whether immigration 
 
 114  Id. at 24. 
 115  Morales , 996 F. Supp. 2d at 24. 
 116  Id. 
 117  Id. 
 118  Id. at 35 (citing Diaz-Bernal v. Myers, 758 F. Supp. 2d 106, 135 (D. Conn. 2010) 
(“[S]eizing a person ‘solely on the basis of race or national origin . . . violate[s] clearly 
established constitutional rights.’”). 
 119  Id. at 35. 
 120  Id. 
 121  Morales , 996 F. Supp. 2d at 36. 
 122  New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (“Congress may not simply 
commandeer the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact 
and enforce a federal regulatory program.”) (internal citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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detainers act as a federal request or as a command to state or local 
officials.”123  The language of the regulation “purports to command 
state and local law enforcement agencies receiving an immigration 
detainer to continue holding the target of the detainer in 
custody.”124 
It would seem, however, that modern Tenth Amendment 
jurisprudence would forbid the federal government from 
mandating state and local government compliance with ICE 
detainers.  In New York v. United States,125 the Supreme Court held 
that a federal law that required states to provide safe disposal of 
radioactive waste produced within their borders violated the Tenth 
Amendment.126  The law also mandated that states would “take title” 
to any waste within their borders of which they had not properly 
disposed and then would “be liable for all damages directly or 
indirectly incurred.”127  According to the majority, requirinq that 
states accept ownership of radioactive waste would impermissibly 
“commandeer” state governments, and mandating state compliance 
with federal regulatory statutes would unlawfully force on states a 
requirement to implement federal legislation.128  The Court held 
that the Tenth Amendment limits the scope of Congress’s power 
under Article I, and as a result, “[t]he Federal Government may not 
compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory 
program.”129 
Later, in Printz v. United States,130 the Court struck down a 
federal statute requiring that state and local law enforcement officers 
conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers.131  
The court held that “Congress cannot . . . conscript[] the States’ 
officers directly. . . . [s]uch commands are fundamentally 
incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.”132  
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia explained that an original 
understanding of the Constitution and the framers’ intent leads 
simply to the conclusion that the federal government can only 
recommend certain regulations to the states, and cannot, by law, 
 
 123  Lasch, supra note 80, at 698. 
 124  Id. at 698-99. 
 125  505 U.S. at 149. 
 126  Id. at 177. 
 127  Id. at 153-54 (internal citations omitted).  
 128  Id. at 176. 
 129  Id. at 188. 
 130  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 131  Lasch, supra note 80, at 699. 
 132  Id.  
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compel them to act in any particular way.133  Justice Scalia drove his 
point home by referencing a historical statute that sought to hold 
federal prisoners in state jail, providing a striking analogy to the 
modern immigration detainers: 
Not only do the enactments of the early Congresses, as far as we are 
aware, contain no evidence of an assumption that the Federal 
Government may command the States’ executive power in the absence 
of a particularized constitutional authorization, they contain some 
indication of precisely the opposite assumption.  On September 23, 
1789-the day before its proposal of the Bill of Rights, the First Congress 
enacted a law aimed at obtaining state assistance of the most 
rudimentary and necessary sort for the enforcement of the new 
Government’s laws: the holding of federal prisoners in state jails at 
federal expense.  Significantly, the law issued not a command to the 
States’ executive, but a recommendation to their legislatures.  Congress 
“recommended to the legislatures of the several States to pass laws, 
making it expressly the duty of the keepers of their goals, to receive and 
safe keep therein all prisoners committed under the authority of the 
United States,” and offered to pay 50 cents per month for each prisoner.  
Moreover, when Georgia refused to comply with the request, Congress’s 
only reaction was a law authorizing the marshal in any State that failed 
to comply with the Recommendation of September 23, 1789, to rent a 
temporary jail until provision for a permanent one could be made.134 
Justice Scalia also pointed out that the statute violated the 
separation of powers because the Constitution vests all executive 
power in the president, and Congress, as a result, cannot grant 
executive authority to state and local governments.135 
In light of the realities of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, 
“Congress appears to have taken care to avoid Tenth Amendment 
issues” in crafting the immigration statute.136  The statute gives state 
or local LEAs the discretion to “determine whether or not to issue . . . 
a detainer.”137 
If Congress had written the Immigration and Naturalization Act 
(“INA”) Section 287(d) in a manner that required, rather than 
permitted, local law enforcement officials to report those arrested 
 
 133  Printz, 521 U.S. at 922-23. 
 134  Id. at 909-10 (internal citations omitted).  
 135  Id. at 909 (“The Constitution does not leave to speculation who is to administer 
the laws enacted by Congress; the President, it says, ‘shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed,’ . . . The Brady Act effectively transfers this responsibility to 
thousands of CLEOs in the 50 States, who are left to implement the program without 
meaningful Presidential control . . .  The insistence of the Framers upon unity in the 
Federal Executive-to ensure both vigor and accountability-is well known . . .  That unity 
would be shattered, and the power of the President would be subject to reduction, if 
Congress could act as effectively without the President as with him, by simply requiring 
state officers to execute its laws.”). 
 136  Lasch, supra note 80, at 700. 
 137  Immigration and Nationality Act, §287(d)(3), 66 Stat. 233 (1952) (codified as 
amended 8 U.S.C. §1357(d)(3) (2006)). 
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for violating controlled substance laws, and suspected of being 
immigration violators, and if it required them to request 
immigration officials to “determine promptly whether or not to 
issue a detainer,” the law would be very similar to the one at issue 
in Printz.138 
However, the language of the detainer regulation is more 
problematic in terms of compatibility with the Tenth 
Amendment.139  The regulation reads as follows: 
(d) Temporary detention at Department Request.  Upon a determination 
by the Department to issue a detainer for an alien not otherwise detained 
by a criminal justice agency, such agency shall maintain custody of the 
alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, 
and holidays in order to permit assumption of custody by the 
Department.140 
Thus, if the regulation is interpreted in a manner that requires 
local LEAs to comply with detainer requests, it will surely be 
regarded as unconstitutional.  The Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
dealt with this issue in Galarza v. Szalczyk,141 noting that “[i]t is clear 
to us that reading Section 287.7 to mean that a federal detainer filed 
with a state or local LEA is a command to detain an individual on 
behalf of the federal government, would violate the anti-
commandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment.”142  The court 
held that “[b]ecause of this constitutional problem, and because 
Congress has made no mention in the INA that it intends for DHS 
to issue mandatory detainers . . . we must read the regulation as 
authorizing only permissive requests that local LEAs keep suspected 
aliens subject to deportation in custody.”143 
iv. State and Local Government Liability in Detainer-
Related Suits 
Consistent with the aforementioned legal issues, state and local 
governments can be liable in detainer-related suits, especially 
because compliance with ICE detainers is not mandatory.  The 
following cases illustrate the potential liability faced by local 
governments for detaining individuals pursuant to ICE detainers. 
 
 138  Lasch, supra note 80, at 700. 
 139  8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d). 
 140  Id. (emphasis added).  
 141  Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 636 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 142  Id. at 644. 
 143  Id. at 645.  
OMAR FINAL FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2016  8:59 PM 
2015] BREAKING THE ICE 179 
1. Galarza v. Szalczyk 
The facts of Galarza, discussed above, led to significant 
payments from the particular city and county governments 
involved, as well as the federal government.144  In Galarza, the Third 
Circuit ruled in Galarza’s favor, holding that states and 
municipalities are not required to hold people based on ICE 
detainers.145  The court recognized that ICE detainers are requests, 
not commands, and as a result, Lehigh County was free to disregard 
the ICE detainer.146  For that reason, it shared responsibility for 
violating Galarza’s Fourth Amendment and due process rights.147  
The case has since settled.148  Together, the United States and the 
City of Allentown paid Galarza $50,000, and Lehigh County paid 
$95,000 in damages and attorney’s fees.149 
2. Morales v. Chadbourne 
Ada Morales was born in Guatemala and became a United 
States citizen in 1995.150  In May 2009, she was arrested by Rhode 
Island police on state charges related to alleged misrepresentations 
on a state public benefits application.151  At some point, a state 
official reported Ms. Morales’ name to the local ICE office.152  
Shortly thereafter, ICE lodged a detainer against her.153  During that 
time, a judge ordered Ms. Morales released, but Rhode Island 
officials continued to hold her in custody for an additional 24 hours 
because of the ICE detainer.154  Ms. Morales protested to the officials 
that she was indeed a U.S. citizen, and even offered to show them 
documentation, but her complaints fell on deaf ears.155  She was 
finally released after ICE agents took her into federal custody, 
transported her to their office, and interviewed her.156  This was not 
the first time Ms. Morales had been wrongfully detained; in fact, she 
 
 144  See supra Part I. 
 145  ACLU, supra note 12. 
 146  Id.  
 147  Id. 
 148  Id.  
 149  Id.  
 150  Morales, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 24. 
 151  Id.  
 152  Id. at 25. 
 153  Id. at 24-25. 
 154  Id. at 25. 
 155  Id.  
 156  Morales, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 25. 
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was detained five years earlier under similar circumstances.157 
In April 2012, Ms. Morales filed a lawsuit against federal and 
state defendants, alleging violations of her Fourth Amendment and 
due process rights and her rights under state law.158  The district 
court ruled that Morales alleged sufficient facts—on at least some of 
her claims—to support government violations of her rights based 
on the Fourth Amendment, procedural due process, and the Equal 
Protection Clause.159 
3. Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County 
On March 14, 2012, Miranda-Olivares was arrested for 
violating a domestic violence restraining order and was sent to 
jail.160  The jail did not know Miranda-Olivares’s immigration status, 
but it had a policy of notifying ICE when a foreign-born person is 
brought to the jail on a warrant or probable cause charge.161  The 
following morning, the jail received an immigration detainer, issued 
by ICE, for Miranda-Olivares.162  The detainer simply stated that 
DHS had “initiated an investigation” to determine whether 
Miranda-Olivares was subject to removal from the United States.163 
The same day, a judge set Miranda-Olivares’s bail at $5,000, 
and in order to make bail, Miranda-Olivares was required to post 
$500.164  Family members were prepared to post the $500 bail, but 
jail officials, on multiple occasions, warned that posting bail would 
not result in release because the jail would keep Miranda-Olivares 
in custody as a result of the detainer.165  After two weeks, Miranda-
Olivares’s criminal case was resolved, and she was given a sentence 
of time-served.166  But, rather than release Miranda-Olivares, the jail 
kept her in custody an additional day, until ICE assumed custody.167 
Miranda-Olivares sued Clackamas County for violating her civil 
rights.168  The court rejected the county’s claim that it was legally 
 
 157  Id.  
 158  Id. at 23-24. 
 159  Id. at 54. 
 160  Miranda-Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at *1. 
 161  Id.  
 162  Id.  
 163  Id.  
 164  Id. at *2. 
 165  Id.  
 166  Miranda-Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at *3. 
 167  Id.  
 168  Id. at *1. 
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required to comply with the detainer.169  Ultimately, the court ruled 
in favor Miranda-Olivares, holding that the county violated her 
Fourth Amendment rights by detaining her, despite a court order 
authorizing her release.170 
B. State Regulation: The TRUST Act 
When passing laws related to immigration, states must be 
especially careful to avoid issues of preemption because the federal 
government traditionally regulates immigration law. 
i. Is the TRUST Act Preempted by Federal Regulation? 
In Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court illustrated how 
modern preemption doctrine plays out in the context of state laws 
regulating immigration.171  The Court explained that the 
preemption dilemma with respect to immigration regulation arises 
from the principle of federalism, which entails that “both the 
National and State Governments have elements of sovereignty the 
other is bound to respect.”172  The court observed that, “[f]rom the 
existence of two sovereigns follows the possibility that laws can be 
in conflict or at cross-purposes.”173  Yet, under our constitutional 
design, “[t]he Supremacy Clause provides a clear rule that federal 
law shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”174  Pursuant to this 
principle, “Congress has the power to preempt state law.”175 
The court outlined three situations where federal law preempts 
state law.  The first is when Congress passes a bill containing a 
provision that “expressly preempts” state regulation.176  The second 
situation occurs when “the States are precluded from regulating 
conduct in a field that Congress . . . has determined must be 
regulated by its exclusive governance.”177  Generally, “[t]he intent to 
displace state law altogether can be inferred from a framework of 
regulation so pervasive that Congress left no room for the States to 
supplement it [or] where there is a federal interest so dominant that 
the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state 
 
 169  Id. at *4-8. 
 170  Id. at *1. 
 171  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2500.  
 172  Id.  
 173  Id.  
 174  Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, § X, cl. 2.) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 175  Id.  
 176  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2500-01. 
 177  Id. at 2501 (citations omitted). 
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law on the same subject.”178  The last form of preemption occurs 
when state laws conflict with federal law.179  Conflict preemption 
includes those cases where it is impossible to comply with both 
federal and state law and those situations where state law “stands as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purpose and objectives of Congress.”180 
In Arizona, the court examined an Arizona law, Senate Bill 
1070, against the above-mentioned preemption framework.181  The 
court considered four sections of the bill.  Section 3, which makes it 
a crime for someone to be in the United States without proper 
authorization, was preempted because Congress left no room for 
states to regulate in that field or enhance federal prohibitions.182  
Section 5(C), which makes it a crime for undocumented immigrants 
to apply for a job or work in Arizona, was also preempted because 
it stood as an obstacle to the federal regulatory regime.183  Section 6, 
authorizing state law enforcement officials to arrest without a 
warrant any individual otherwise lawfully in the country for an 
offense that would make him removable, was preempted because 
whether and when to arrest someone for being unlawfully in the 
country was a question solely for the federal government.184 
ii. The TRUST Act Is Not Preempted 
Following this framework, it does not appear that federal law 
preempts the TRUST Act.  An important distinction must be made 
between Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070 and the TRUST Act.  The former 
is affirmative legislation that seeks to create a regime of immigration 
law separate and distinct from existing federal regulations, while the 
 
 178  Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).  
 179  Id. (citations omitted). 
 180  Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 181  Id. at 2501.  
 182  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502 (“[W]ith respect to the subject of alien registration, 
Congress intended to preclude States from complementing the federal law, or enforcing 
additional or auxiliary regulations . . .  Section 3 is preempted by federal law.” 
(quotation marks omitted and formatting altered)).  
 183  Id. at 2505 (“The correct instruction to draw from the text, structure, and history 
of IRCA is that Congress decided it would be inappropriate to impose criminal 
penalties on aliens who seek or engage in unauthorized employment.  It follows that a 
state law to the contrary is an obstacle to the regulatory system Congress chose.”). 
 184  Id. at 2507. (“Congress has put in place a system in which state officers may not 
make warrantless arrests of aliens based on possible removability except in specific, 
limited circumstances.  By nonetheless authorizing state and local officers to engage in 
these enforcement activities as a general mater, § 6 creates an obstacle to the full 
purpose and objectives of Congress . . . Section 6 is preempted by federal law”).  
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latter is merely a kind of qualified compliance with federal requests.  
This follows from the fact that obedience to ICE detainers is not 
compulsory, and that ICE detainers serve merely as requests.  
Recently, the DHS acknowledged, “detainers issued pursuant to 8 
C.F.R. § 287.7 are voluntary requests.”185  Thus, the TRUST Act might 
have raised preemption issues if Congress intended to mandate state 
compliance with ICE detainers.  It is not clear, however, whether 
Congress intended to mandate state compliance with ICE detainers, 
given the Tenth Amendment implications of doing so.  
Additionally, the Executive Action initiated by the Obama 
Administration, which overhauls portions of the Secure 
Communities Program, better aligns the TRUST Act with the policies 
of federal law, greatly reducing the risk of preemption. 
C. Public Policy Concerns Raised by Detainer Requests 
In addition to the legal issues raised by ICE detainer requests, 
several public policy concerns arise as well.  Among them is the cost 
to state and local governments of enforcing ICE detainers and 
evidence that ICE detainers—and the Secure Communities 
Program—have had no effect on crime, and may actually be an 
obstacle to effective law enforcement. 
i. The Cost of Enforcing Detainer Requests 
The cost to state and local governments of enforcing detainer 
requests is amplified by the fact that the federal government does 
not contribute to the costs incurred by state and local governments 
in enforcing ICE detainers.  According to 8 C.F.R. 287(e), the federal 
government is not responsible for any such costs: 
(e) Financial responsibility for detention.  No detainer issued as a result 
of a determination made under this chapter I shall incur any fiscal 
obligation on the part of the Department, until actual assumption of 
custody by the Department, except as provided in paragraph (d) of this 
section.186 
This is problematic because the cost of jailing people is 
significant and burdensome for state and local governments.  The 
cost of keeping an inmate in prison per day is about $460 in New 
York, $145 in Chicago, and $128.94 in Los Angeles.  In the 
 
 185  RECENT LEGISLATION, supra note 21, at 2596 (citing Defendants’ Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings at 9, Moreno v. Napolitano, 
No. 11-CV-05452, 2013 WL 4014240 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2013)). 
 186  8 C.F.R. § 287.7(e) (2011).  See also Associated Press, NYC’s yearly cost per inmate 
almost as expensive as Ivy League tuition, FOX NEWS (Sept. 30, 2013), 
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2013/09/30/nyc-cost-per-inmate-almost-equals-ivy-
league-education-expenses-tied-to-rikers.html.  
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aggregate, these costs are significant.  Between 2008 and 2012, ICE 
placed approximately 29,323 detainers on legal permanent 
residents and U.S. citizens.187 
Additionally, state and local governments risk significant 
litigation costs if they continue enforcing ICE detainers because they 
are liable in cases where an arrestee’s rights have been violated due 
to detention pursuant to such a detainer.188  Recently a number of 
jurisdictions have incurred significant costs to defend detainer-
related suits.189  As discussed previously, in Galarza v. Szalcyk, the 
City of Allentown paid Galarza $50,000, and Lehigh County paid 
$95,000 in damages and attorney’s fees.190  Jefferson County, 
Colorado paid $40,000 for unjustifiably holding Luis Quezada on 
an ICE detainer.191  Spokane County, Washington agreed to pay 
$40,000 to a man who was wrongly held without bail for 20 days 
because of an ICE detainer.192  New York City paid $145,000 to settle 
a lawsuit where a man was wrongly held by an ICE detainer 
request.193 
In light of these fiscal realities, refusing to honor ICE requests 
or passing a law similar to the Trust Act would significantly reduce 
the chances of wrongfully detaining someone pursuant to a detainer 
request.  Either course of action would allow states and 
municipalities to significantly reduce litigation and settlement costs 
that would otherwise arise.  Hence, from a public policy perspective, 
there is a financial incentive for state and local governments to 
reform their compliance with federal ICE detainers. 
ii. The Effect on Crime 
According to the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at 
Syracuse University (“TRAC”), data from Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”): 
show that no more than 14 percent of the “detainers” issued by the 
government in FY 2012 and the first four months of FY 2013 met the 
agency’s stated goal of targeting individuals who pose a serious threat to 
 
 187  TRAC, ICE Detainers Placed on U.S. Citizens and Legal Permanent Residents, (Feb. 
20, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/311/. 
 188  See supra Part III.A. 
 189  LEGAL ACTION CENTER, Challenging the Use of ICE Immigration Detainers, 
http://www.legalactioncenter.org/clearinghouse/litigation-issue-pages/enforcement-
detainers (last updated June 2013). 
 190  ACLU, supra note 12. 
 191  ACLU, Quezada v. Mink, (Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.aclu.org/cases/quezada-
v-mink.  
 192  LEGAL ACTION CENTER, supra note 189. 
 193  Id. 
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public safety or national security.194 
Indeed, statistics show that “roughly half of the 347,691 individuals 
subject to an ICE detainer (47.7 percent) had no record of a criminal 
conviction, not even a minor traffic violation.”195 
Interestingly, “[t]his thoroughly-documented government 
enforcement effort sharply contrasts with the multiple press releases 
and official statements issued by the agency.”196  Moreover, 
according to Miles & Cox, the Secure Communities Program in 
general has “had no effect on the FBI index crime rate . . . [n]or did 
the program reduce rates of violent crimes—of murder, rape, arson, 
or aggravated assault.”197 
In fact, detainer enforcement significantly hinders community 
policing.  Immigrant residents who are victims or witnesses to crime, 
including domestic violence, are less likely to report crime or 
cooperate with law enforcement when any contact with law 
enforcement could result in deportation.198  A recent study found 
that Latinos, documented and undocumented, often fear even 
minimal contact with the police, including interactions as benign as 
reporting crime or cooperating with a criminal investigation, as a 
result of fears due to potential immigration consequences for 
themselves or their loved ones.199  Therefore, by eliminating or 
constraining compliance with ICE detainers, state and local 
governments can improve relations between law enforcement and 
certain minority communities—which makes for more effective 
policing. 
Given the fact that ICE detainers have little or no effect on 
reducing crime rates and the fact that detainer enforcement strains 
relations between minority communities and the authorities, public 
policy weighs heavily in favor of either eliminating compliance with 
ICE detainers or restricting compliance to those cases involving 
serious crime.  This would ensure that the detainers issued are 
actually having a positive impact on the rate of crime. 
  
 
 194  TRAC, Few ICE Detainers Target Serious Criminals, (Sept. 17, 2013), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/330/. 
 195  Id.  
 196  Id.  
 197  Miles & Cox, supra note 32, at 947.  
 198  Id. 
 199  Nik Theodore, Insecure Communities: Latino Perceptions of Police Involvement in 
Immigration Enforcement (May 2013), http://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/ 
INSECURE_COMMUNITIES_REPORT_FINAL.PDF. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
ICE detainers raise several issues.  Among them are legal and 
constitutional challenges, liability incurred by municipalities, high 
enforcement costs, and an inability to lower crime rates.  Notably, 
there are no legal obstacles in the way of legislation seeking to 
significantly curtail the scope of detainer requests.  Therefore, states 
should follow the path of Connecticut and California and pass 
legislation that significantly limits the scope of compliance with ICE 
detainers.  In addition, local municipalities should consider refusing 
to honor detainers altogether.  While President Obama’s Executive 
Action overhauling the SCP altogether is a step in the right direction, 
it is by no means permanent.  The Executive Action is facing 
challenges in Congress and the courts, and it might be reversed 
following the 2016 presidential elections.  Given the extent of the 
problems raised by ICE detainers, state and local governments ought 
to take the lead in governing the relationship between inmates in 
state and local jails and federal immigration officials, either by 
passing their own version of the Trust Act, or by refusing to honor 
ICE detainers in general. 
